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there is not a compensable taking if one is left with reasonable
access.
In summary, a damaging of one's right of access resulting from an
exercise of the police power is noncompensable unless it amounts to
a taking; but a compensable taking arises only when one is left
without reasonable access to his property. Secondly, the right of ac-
cess cannot be taken for the public use without the payment of com-
pensation. Finally, a property owner must show that he is left totally
without reasonable access to his property in order to recover for dam-
age to his right of access in any particular street resulting from the
construction of an improvement for the public use. Archenhold has
limited the cul-de-sac rule of DuPuy by refusing to fragmentize
the right of access in individual streets. In the future this should
prove to be vital protection to city and state governments in the
construction of public works.
Michael M. Boone
Refusal of State Court To Assume Jurisdiction
After Federal Abstention
I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
Under the abstention doctrine, a federal court stays or dismisses
its proceedings in order to obtain from a state court an authoritative
determination of applicable state law. For effective state adjudication
of the issue, federal courts require review of such decision by the
highest court of the state. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman1 is gen-
erally regarded as the origin of the abstention doctrine, although
federal courts had previously refused to consider cases in which their
jurisdiction had been properly invoked.! Justice Frankfurter, speak-
ing for a unanimous court, stated that the federal district court's
1 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The Court had been asked to rule on the constitutionality of a
Texas Railroad Commission order that stated that no sleeping car could be operated in Texas
unless it was under the control of a pullman conductor.
2 In Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935), the Court ordered a district court
to stay its proceedings where the state court procedure was adequate for supervision of
liquidations. In Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940), the Court
ordered a district court sitting in exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction to leave a difficult ques-
tion of state real property law to the state court. These decisions were based on the princi-
ples that no equity court would unnecessarily give extraordinary equitable relief even though
that court had jurisdiction to do so, and that federal courts of equity should exercise their
discretionary power with proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments
in carrying out their domestic policy.
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decision on state law was merely a forecast of what the state courts
might hold if the same issue were presented to them. The Supreme
Court ordered the federal district court to retain jurisdiction but
to stay proceedings pending an action in the state courts to determine
the issue of state law. The Court reasoned that to do otherwise would
permit a federal court to render only a tentative decision on a consti-
tutional question because it could be displaced by a state ruling which
would obviate the federal constitutional question. Furthermore, such
a tentative decision was thought to create needless friction with state
courts. Pullman was therefore based on two considerations: (1) deci-
sion of the federal constitutional question might become unneces-
sary; and (2) state courts should be given the first opportunity to
interpret state statutes.
The abstention doctrine was invoked in a different context in
Burford v. Sun Oil Co.' There, the Court abstained because of the
undesirability of federal interference with a unified state policy rela-
tive to the highly regulated and complex oil industry. The Court's
purpose was
[to] leave these problems of Texas law to the state court where each
may be handled as "one more item in a continuous series of adjust-
ments."' These questions of regulation of the industry by the state
administrative agency . . . so clearly involve basic problems of Texas
policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the Texas
courts the first opportunity to consider them.'
Burford is significant in the evolution of the abstention doctrine
for two reasons: First, the Pullman technique was not used; the
Court did not order the lower federal court to retain jurisdiction
pending an action in the state courts, but instead ordered the action
dismissed. Second, in Burford, unlike Pullman, the jurisdiction was
based not only upon the existence of a federal question but also upon
diversity of citizenship.! Because of the differences between Pullman
and Burford, some text writers consider that the cases represent two
different abstention doctrines.!
a319 U.S. 315 (1943). A district court refused to enjoin a Texas regulatory agency
from enforcing an order permitting the drilling of certain oil wells and dismissed the ac-
tion. The Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered an injunction. The Supreme Court reversed
the Fifth Circuit and affirmed the judgment of the district court.
"Citing Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 584 (1940).
5319 U.S. at 332.
6 319 U.S. at 336. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, argued that Congress in 28 U.S.C.
5 1332, had provided a federal forum to litigants in diversity actions which could not be
abrogated.
7See, e.g., WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 52 (1963); Gowen & Izlar, Federal Conrt Ab-
stention in Diversity of Citizenship Litigation, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 194; 1A MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 2101-24, 3331-32 (2d ed. 1961).
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The Court further extended the principles of the abstention doc-
trine in a situation similar to Burford in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n
v. Southern Ry. s The Court held that comity required the fed-
eral courts in their discretion to decline the opportunity to interfere
with state policies when adequate relief could be afforded through the
state courts. Whether abstention could be invoked in a common law
action where jurisdiction was based only on diversity of citizenship
was not discussed in either Burford or Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n.
Whether a federal court should abstain in a diversity of citizenship
case was first squarely presented in Meredith v. Winter Haven.!
Here, the Supreme Court refused to invoke the doctrine. It reasoned
that none of the purposes for abstention were present, and that a
federal court could not refuse that jurisdiction, properly invoked,
which Congress had created for litigants in diversity cases. It felt
that abstention was an extraordinary doctrine and should be invoked
only in special circumstances."
The special circumstances alluded to in the Meredith case were
expanded by the Court in Louisiana Power & Light v. City of Thi-
bodaux,1 where the Court invoked the abstention doctrine for the
first time in a common law diversity suit. All previous exercises of
the power had been in equity. The Court recognized the equitable
origin of the abstention doctrine and the fact that an eminent domain
suit was classified as a suit at common law. Nevertheless, the Court
reasoned that since the power of eminent domain was intimately
involved with the sovereign prerogative of the state, a federal judge
was justified in staying proceedings pending a decision by the state's
highest court, rather than make a tentative and dubious forecast.
This sovereign prerogative concept, combined with the Court's desire
to avoid federal-state friction, was the basis of the Court's decision.
8341 U.S. 341 (1951).
' 320 U.S. 228 (1943). Plaintiff-bondholders sued in federal district court for a declara-
tory judgment that defendant-city should not call and retire certain bonds and for an
injunction restraining the city from calling the bonds. The district court dismissed for fail-
ure to state a cause of action. The Fifth Circuit reversed, ordering the case dismissed without
prejudice to plaintiffs' right to proceed in state court. The law in question was unclear. The
Supreme Court reversed and ordered the federal district court to decide the case on the
merits.
"°Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (avoidance of a premature de-
cision of a constitutional question); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (inter-
ference with state policy in a highly regulated and complex industry).
"1 360 U.S. 25 (1959). The city of Thibodaux filed an eminent domain proceeding as-
serting a taking of the land, buildings, and equipment of Louisiana Power and Light Co.,
a Florida corporation; the defendant removed the action to the federal district court on
the basis of diversity of citizenship. The district court abstained. The Fifth Circuit reversed,
255 F.2d 774 (sth Cir. 1958), holding that the abstention procedure was not available in
an eminent domain proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the decision of
the district court.
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The same day that Thibodaux was decided, a strikingly similar
case, County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.," also was decided.
This, too, was an eminent domain case, but the state law was
thought to be clear. Here, the Court did not invoke the abstention
doctrine. Considered together, the Thibodaux and Mashuda decisions
seem to set forth the principle that the abstention doctrine may be
invoked in a diversity eminent domain suit when the state law at
issue is unsettled or unclear. Thibodaux and Mashuda also are signifi-
cant for the fact that they were both common law actions and both
were in the federal courts on the basis of diversity of citizenship.
Florida in 1957 enacted a unique statute" which allowed either
the Supreme Court or a federal court of appeals to certify questions
of state law to the Florida Supreme Court. In Clay v. Sun Ins. Of-
fice Ltd., " the Supreme Court utilized this statute, ordering the
Fifth Circuit to certify questions of state law to the Florida Supreme
Court for resolution. This method has the advantage of avoiding
the necessity of going through the entire state court system for an
authoritative answer to the issue of state law before the Court can
decide federal issues involved. Since the Clay decision, the Court has
in two other instances certified questions of state law directly to the
Florida court." To date, no other state has followed the Florida ex-
ample.
II. UNITED SERVICES LIFE INS. Co. v. DELANEY"
United Services Life Insurance Company insured the life of Lt.
Robert H. Delaney on October 1, 1957. The policy contained the
following clause:
LIMITATION DUE To AVIATION HAZARD
If this policy shall become a claim by death of the insured due to any
service, training, travel, flight, ascent or descent in, on, or from any
species of aircraft at anytime, except death resulting from travel as a
passenger on an aircraft owned and operated by the United States Gov-
ernment . . . the liability of the company under this policy shall be
limited to the premiums paid hereunder: ... any provision in this policy
to the contrary notwithstanding. (Emphasis added.)
On May 8, 1959, Lt. Delaney died of injuries received as the pilot
12360 U.S. 185 (1959).
' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1957).
14 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
"See Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 (1963), and Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375
U.S. 136 (1963).




and only occupant of an aircraft owned and operated by the United
States Government. The insurer, a District of Columbia corporation,
denied liability on the basis of the aviation hazard clause. Mrs. De-
laney, a citizen of Texas, brought suit in the federal district court
on the basis of diversity of citizenship, contending that the decedent
was a passenger within the meaning of the policy. The federal district
judge, applying Texas law, decided in favor of Mrs. Delaney on the
basis of Continental Cas. Co. v. Warren." The Fifth Circuit affirmed
in a two to one decision."8 In Warren, the Texas Supreme Court con-
strued "as a passenger" in a similar aviation hazard clause to mean
f*as an occupant."" Upon an en banc rehearing of Delaney along
with Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l. Bank,"° the court re-
versed its earlier holding in a five to four decision. 1 A majority of
the Fifth Circuit thought that the principles of the Warren case as
applied to the facts of the Delaney and Paul Revere cases were too
unclear for the federal court to provide more than a forecast of
what a state court confronted with the same issue might decide. The
court invoked the abstention doctrine, staying the proceedings and
retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of taking such further action
as might be required. The parties were advised to seek a declaratory
judgment in the Texas courts as to the meaning of the word "pas-
senger" under Texas law. The four dissenting circuit judges felt
that the court had no right to refuse the jurisdiction Congress had
provided" and that the facts did not fall within any of the classes
of cases where the abstention doctrine previously had been applied.'
Pursuant to the Fifth Circuit's instructions, the insurer brought
suit in a Texas district court for a declaratory judgment to construe
the aviation hazard clause in the insurance contract. The district
court dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Texas court of civil
appeals affirmed, holding that the suit was instituted for the purpose
of procuring an advisory opinion." In affirming the civil appeals de-
cision, 5 the Texas Supreme Court held that the purpose of the Fifth
Circuit in staying proceedings was to obtain from the Texas courts
" 152 Tex. 164, 254 S.W.2d 762 (1953).
18308 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1962).
19254 S.W.2d 762, 764 (1953).
20328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
21 Ibid.
22 28 U.S.C. S 1332. This section provides a federal forum for citizens of diferent states.
" Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (avoidance of a premature con-
stitutional question); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (interference with
state policy in a highly regulated and complex industry); Louisiana Power & Light v.
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (an eminent domain action with an unclear issue
of state law in question).
24386 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
25396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
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a decision on a point of Texas law so that the federal court could
render a judgment thereon." The Court noted that as a prerequisite
to the declaratory judgment process, "(a) there shall be a real con-
troversy between the parties, which (b) will be actually determined
by the judicial declaration sought."'7 The court then held that the
Fifth Circuit's reservation of jurisdiction to render final judgment
made the state proceedings advisory in nature since a state court
must have the power to settle the controversy by entry of final
judgment. Justice Steakley, speaking for the dissenters,"8 stated that
the Texas court's decision on the merits of the case would constitute
a final judgment due to the Erie rule and the principles of res
judicata.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Delaney was based on the Pullman
and Thibodaux cases.2" Yet in Delaney there is no constitutional issue
that would be premature. The decision is clearly inconsistent with the
rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the Meredith" decision. Of
the factors previously provid~ng the basis for abstaining- (1)
avoidance of a premature constitutional adjudication," (2) equitable
discretion to refuse jurisdiction,3 (3) interference with a state ad-
ministrative agency in a complex and highly regulated industry,"
(4) adequate state court review of an administrative order,34 (5) em-
inent domain action involving an issue of unsettled state law'-none
were present.
The technique employed in abstaining in Delaney also appears in-
correct. The court retained jurisdiction even though only a single
issue of state law was in question-the construction of a clause in an
insurance contract. There was no reason to retain jurisdiction if the
issue as decided by the state court would settle the dispute between
the parties. This retention was the primary reason for the refusal of
the Texas courts to take jurisdiction. The better method would have
been to dismiss the complaint as was done in Burford and Alabama
I id. at 860.
217 Ibid.
28 Chief Justice Calvert and Mr. Justice Hamilton joined his dissent.
29 328 F.2d at 484. The court stated: "The Supreme Court has 'increasingly recognized
the wisdom of staying actions in the federal courts pending determination by a state court
of decisive issues of state law.' Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360
U.S. 25, 79 S. Ct. 1070, 3 L.Ed.2d 1058, reh. den, 360 U.S. 940, 79 S. Ct. 1442, 3
L.Ed.2d 1552. It is appropriate that this court stay its hand until the courts of the State
of Texas shall have declared the law of the State of Texas which is applicable to and con-
trolling in the disposition of these appeals."
3o See Note 9 supra and accompanying text.
"Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
22 See note 3 supra.
aaBurford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
'MAlabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
as See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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Pub. Serv. Comm'n, assuming that the statute of limitations would
not bar further proceedings in state court.
By invoking the abstention doctrine in Delaney, the Fifth Circuit
has set forth the rule that a federal court must abstain in a common
law diversity action if the issues of state law are unclear. Such a rule,
if widely used by the lower federal courts, could completely destroy
federal diversity jurisdiction. Supreme Court dictum in McNeese v.
Board of Educ." indicated that mere difficulty in ascertaining state
law did not justify abstention. Yet, in Delaney, this was exactly the
reason given for abstention.
When both federal and state courts are employed in litigation
due to the abstention doctrine, the long delay and piecemeal litiga-
tion make the doctrine of doubtful value." In Spector Motor Serv.
Inc. v. McLaughlin,"5 nine years of litigation in five different courts
were required before the case was finally decided on the merits."9 In
Delaney, although the insured died in 1959, a decision on the merits
was not reached until March 31, 1966, when the Fifth Circuit va-
cated its prior decision and reversed and remanded, holding that Lt.
Delaney was not a passenger within the meaning of the clause.
The Texas Supreme Court, in refusing to accept jurisdiction in
Delaney, relied on Morrow v. Corbin" and Douglas Oil Co. v. State'
to show that it was being asked for an advisory opinion.' It should
as373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963).
aMr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 228
(1960), criticised the doctrine for this reason:
Some litigants have long purses. Many, however, can hardly afford one lawsuit,
let alone two. Shuttling the parties between state and federal tribunals is a sure
way of defeating the ends of justice. The pursuit of justice is not an academic
exercise. There are no foundations to finance the resolution of nice state law
questions involved in federal court litigation. The parties are entitled-absent
unique and rare situations-to adjudication of their rights in the tribunals
which Congress has empowered to act.
38 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
asSpector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
40358 F.2d 714 (5th Cir, 1966).
41122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641 (1933). The court held unconstitutional a statute
[TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2218b (1933)] authorizing certification of constitutional
questions by the district and county courts to the courts of civil appeals.
4281 S.W.2d 1064 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, Federal Royalty Co.
v. State, 128 Tex. 324, 98 S.W.2d 993 (1936). This case involved certified questions of
law to the Austin Court of Civil Appeals and was cited by the Delaney court for its quota-
tion from an earlier hearing of the case before the Texas Supreme Court: "The certificate
calls upon the Supreme Court to give an advisory opinion, which is not permitted. (124
Tex. 232, 76 S.W.2d 1043, 1044)."
" In Bichel v. Heard, 328 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), the court of civil appeals
held that an action to declare an order of a police chief invalid did not involve a justiciable
controversy until the order was actually enforced against the plaintiff. In California Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc., 160 Tex. 586, 334 S.W.2d 780 (1960), the question
of whether the proposed use of a certain type of bottle by one of the parties would violate
a previous injunction was merely an advisory opinion until California Products marketed
its bottle in the same market with Puretex. The court of civil appeals in Republic Cas. Co.
[Vol. 20
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be pointed out that both of these cases were decided before the pas-
sage of the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act." Before the act, a suit
not asking for equitable or consequential relief was considered to be
an advisory opinion.' However, under the act, courts are empowered
to declare rights and other legal obligations whether or not other
relief is sought.' The court in the Delaney case apparently misunder-
stood the purpose of declaratory relief. Previously, in construing the
Texas Declaratory Judgment Act, the Texas Supreme Court had
declared that the purpose of the declaratory judgment was to provide
"a speedy and effective remedy for the determination of the rights
of the parties when a real controversy has arisen." 7 It had also stated
that "the action for declaratory judgment is an instrumentality to
be wielded in the interest of preventative justice and its scope should
not be hedged about by technicalities." In the Delaney case, the
court seems to ignore its own holdings. The refusal to assume juris-
diction certainly negates any "speedy and effective" relief, as it
leaves the parties without a decision on the merits after several years
of litigation. Calling a decision on the merits of the case an advisory
opinion seems to be a "technicality." All that would be left for the
Fifth Circuit to do would be to dismiss or enter judgment for the
liquidated amount due under the policy. The Court stated that the
retention of jurisdiction by the Fifth Circuit prevented the Texas
courts from rendering a final enforceable judgment.4 In Texas, as a
prerequisite to a declaratory judgment proceeding, there must be a
controversy which will actually be determined by the judicial dec-
laration sought." The court stated that the Erie rule was one of pre-
cedent and wholly unrelated to res judicata. While this is undoubted-
ly true, the court is ignoring the realities of the situation. The suit
is concerned with but a single point of state law, and a decision by
the court would be final as there would really be nothing left for
the federal court to decide. The state decision would conclusively
settle the controversy between the parties. The court cited England
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners"1 for the proposition that
a state decision in some circumstances on a federal issue might not be
v. Obregon, 290 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e., assumed jurisdiction
and ruled on the merits in a case where the insurer had sought a declaratory judgment,
alleging non-liability under an exclusion clause in the policy.
'TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (1943).45 See notes 41 and 42 supra.
'TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (1943).47 Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709 (1945).
4SGuilliams v. Koonsman, 154 Tex. 401, 279 S.W.2d 579 (1955).
40396 S.W.2d 855, 859.
5ald. at 860.
51 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
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res judicata. However, the court in Delaney had to decide only the
single state issue. In view of this, it is difficult to see why the state
decision on a state issue would not be res judicata.
In his dissent, Justice Steakley recognized this conclusion when
he stated: "What is decided by our courts will terminate the con-
troversy between the parties and in my view will be res judicata
as to the entire case. Clearly, the judgment will be a decision made
in adversary litigation in our courts and will leave nothing for the
federal courts to decide.""
III. CONCLUSION
By ignoring the principles of res judicata, the Erie doctrine, and its
previous holdings in construing the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act,
the Texas Supreme Court was mistaken in calling a decision on the
merits of the Delaney litigation an "advisory opinion." The Fifth
Circuit seemingly misapplied the abstention doctrine in abstaining
in a common law diversity suit. Both the Fifth Circuit and the Texas
Supreme Court have treated Delaney, in the words of Justice Doug-
las, as an "academic exercise,""5 in denying relief to the parties be-
fore them. Because of the long delay and expense to the parties, the
abstention doctrine as applied in Delaney appears to have doubtful
value. There are not present in the Delaney litigation any of the
exceptional circumstances previously providing the basis for federal
abstention, and the rule of Delaney threatens the very existence of
federal diversity jurisdiction. For these reasons, the U. S. Supreme
Court should, at its earliest opportunity, reappraise the abstention
doctrine, limit its application to exceptional circumstances, and
enumerate clearly and concisely once and for all exactly under what
circumstances the lower federal courts may invoke the abstention
doctrine.
John M. McMullen
52 396 S.W.2d at 867 (Steakley, J., dissenting).
53 See note 37 supra.
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